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The canonical ‘New Neoclassical Synthesis’ model for monetary policy analysis has 
been recognised by several authors recently as providing limited scope for the analysis of 
fiscal policy. This is because it embodies ‘Ricardian Equivalence’, so that changes in 
government debt, when accompanied by changes in lump-sum taxation, have no real effects 
on the economy. To give government debt - and thus also government budget deficits 
financed by borrowing - a more interesting and realistic role, these authors have begun to 
incorporate alternative microeconomic assumptions which break Ricardian Equivalence. An 
important class of models which introduce ‘non-Ricardian’ behaviour is overlapping 
generations models. In this paper, we examine the consequences for the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy of combining overlapping generations with staggered price setting. 
A plausible hypothesis about the effect of fiscal policy in such an environment might be 
as follows. A one-period tax cut financed by an increase in government debt which is then 
held permanently at its new higher level would stimulate consumption demand. This is for 
the standard reason that, although agents would rationally anticipate higher future taxes to 
service the increased debt interest, a proportion of the taxes would fall on agents not yet born, 
so that currently-alive agents - the recipients of the tax cut - would perceive their lifetime 
wealth to have risen. In the presence of temporary nominal rigidities, caused by prices being 
re-set only intermittently and in an asynchronised way, the increase in aggregate demand 
would then raise output in a typical Keynesian fashion. 
Below, we test this hypothesis by constructing a careful dynamic general equilibrium 
(DGE) model with the aforementioned features. We then use it to study the basic fiscal policy 
experiment just described. Surprisingly, we do not find that an expansionary short-run effect 
on output is bound to occur. Indeed, in the baseline version of our analysis, a fiscal expansion 
has no short-run effect on output different from its (relatively insignificant) long-run effect. 
In other words, it causes neither boom nor slump. Fiscal policy in this case is completely 
ineffective as a tool of macroeconomic management. This is despite setting it in a DGE   2
model of the macroeconomy which deliberately incorporates features which might be 
expected to ensure its effectiveness. 
What is the explanation for fiscal ineffectiveness? We show that the critical factor is the 
monetary policy regime. In our baseline case, we assume a Taylor Rule for monetary policy, 
i.e. a feedback rule making the nominal interest rate a function of current inflation. (For 
simplicity we omit output from the Taylor Rule, but its inclusion would not alter the result.) 
In recent years this has become the standard way to represent monetary policy, for reasons 
which have been extensively discussed in the literature. However in an overlapping-
generations environment, our paper shows that the Taylor Rule has a disabling effect on 
fiscal policy. By way of comparison we also consider what happens if monetary policy is 
conducted by fixing the money supply, which was the standard assumption until it was 
displaced by the Taylor Rule. Here we find the expected Keynesian result: a debt-financed 
tax cut causes a short-run boom in output. Over time the boom dies away as prices are 
gradually adjusted. Why should the responses be so different? We trace the cause to the 
endogeneity of the money supply which applies under a Taylor Rule. We find that a debt-
financed tax cut induces a sudden reduction in the money supply. This offsets the 
expansionary effect of the increase in government debt itself. When, instead, the money 
supply is held constant, such an offsetting effect is prevented. 
Although other authors have also recently begun to study fiscal policy, and its 
interaction with monetary policy, in ‘non-Ricardian’ DGE models, we are not aware that the 
drastic effect of a Taylor Rule on the effectiveness of fiscal policy has been noted before. 
Bénassy (2005)
1 shows that the Taylor Principle for the determinacy of equilibrium is 
radically altered when overlapping generations are introduced in the manner of Weil (1987, 
1991), under both flexible and staggered prices. Piergallini (2006) uses overlapping 
generations in the manner of Blanchard (1985) to study the determinacy question. Leith and 
Wren-Lewis (2006) construct a two-country model with overlapping generations and 
staggered prices to study the stability of a monetary union under feedback rules for monetary 
and fiscal policy. Galí et al. (2007) break Ricardian Equivalence by using ‘rule-of-thumb’ 
                                                 
1 See also Bénassy (2007), Ch. 4   3
consumers and show that this can explain the econometric evidence of a positive effect of 
government spending on consumption. Finally, Chadha and Nolan (2007) look at optimal 
simple monetary and fiscal policy rules in a Blanchard-type framework. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: the microeconomic elements of the model are 
presented in Section 2, while Section 3 examines the effectiveness of fiscal policy when 
monetary policy is governed by a Taylor Rule. Section 4 does the same when monetary 
policy is governed by a money-supply rule, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Structure of the Model 
The model brings together staggered price setting in the manner of Calvo (1983) and 
overlapping generations in the manner of Blanchard (1985). We are mainly interested in the 
qualitative features of such an economy rather than in quantitative matching of the data. 
Hence we construct the model as sparingly as possible, abstracting from elements which 
would complicate the dynamics unnecessarily and increase the difficulty of understanding the 
mechanisms at work. A DGE model with overlapping generations and overlapping price 
setting already contains numerous intrinsic sources of dynamics. Amongst the elements 
omitted is capital accumulation. Although this is very commonly studied in conjunction with 
overlapping generations, our focus here is on short- to medium-run time spans during which 
changes in capital can reasonably be ignored. 
(i) Household behaviour 
We use a discrete-time version of Blanchard’s (1985) ‘perpetual youth’ overlapping 
generations model, in which agents have an exogenous probability, q (0 < q ≤ 1) of surviving 
to the next period. This well-known framework conveniently permits the average length of 
life to be parameterised and includes infinite lives as the special case q = 1. In order to allow 
for money and for labour as an input to production we include real money balances and 
labour as arguments of the utility function. However the latter raises a potential difficulty, 
namely that, if leisure is a ‘normal’ good, a fraction of households will have a negative labour   4
supply. To avoid this unsatisfactory implication, we assume a particular utility function 
which makes labour supply wealth-independent.
2 
Specifically, the household’s optimisation problem may be stated as: 
maximise  ()
1
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 for  t = n,...,∞. 
Here, n is the current period and s (≤ n) is the household’s birth-period.  , s t C  denotes the 
composite consumption in period t (defined below) of a household born in period s; and 
likewise for money holdings  , s t M , bond holdings  ,
N
s t B  and labour supply  , s t L .  t P , t W , t i  
indicate the price index, wage, and nominal interest rate, respectively; while  t Π , t T  denote 
profit receipts from firms and a lump-sum tax, which are assumed age-independent. The 
parameters satisfy 0 < β,δ < 1, ε > 1, η > 0. Note also that, as in Blanchard (1985), the 
household receives an ‘annuity’ at the gross rate 1/q on his total financial wealth if he 
survives, this wealth passing to the insurance company if he dies. This is an actuarially fair 
scheme which nets out across the population so that in equilibrium the profits of insurance 
companies are zero. 
The utility function (1) is a modified version of one originating with Greenwood, 
Hercowitz and Huffman (1988) (‘GHH’). The modification consists in introducing real 
money balances. Its implications for behaviour can be seen by deriving the first-order 
conditions for the above problem, which are as follows: 
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2 This issue is discussed in more detail in Ascari and Rankin (2007). The utility function used here is first 
proposed there.   5
Here, 1 t r +  denotes 1 (1 ) / tt t iPP + + , the real interest rate. It is also helpful to define money 
demand per unit of consumption,  ,, / s tt s t M PC , as  , s t Z . Then (4) shows that  , s t Z is the same 
for all agents, irrespective of their birth date s, and is a simple decreasing function of the 
nominal interest rate. From (5) we then observe that an agent’s labour supply,  , s t L , does not 
depend on his consumption (except through  , s t Z ), and that, in consequence of this and of the 
fact that  , s t Z  is common for all agents, labour supply is also independent of s. This is our 
reason for using GHH preferences: it eliminates the income effect on labour supply which 
would otherwise be manifested by the presence of  , s t C  in (5),  , s t C  being a variable which is 
generally increasing with an agent’s age, t-s. This enables us to avoid the problem of old 
agents having negative labour supply.
3 
Incorporating wealth-independent labour supply does have a cost, however, which is 
that the utility function is not additively separable. One consequence is that there is a direct 
effect of real balances on labour supply, as can be seen from (5). This is the ‘Brock effect’ 
(Brock (1974)). Intuitively, higher holdings of real balances (or, to be precise, higher  , s t Z ) 
give the household an incentive to supply more labour since they complement consumption, 
raising the marginal utility of the latter. We would not expect this effect to be empirically 
important but since it is present in our theoretical model it is necessary to take account of it. 
Non-separability also introduces direct effects of labour supply and of real balances on 
consumption. This can be seen from the presence of  , s t L  and  , s t Z in (3), which is a version of 
the Euler equation for consumption. The composite term  ,, (/) s ts t Z L
δε ηε
− , which is subtracted 
from both sides of (3), acts like a ‘subsistence’ level of consumption. In our model the Euler 
equation can be viewed as determining the growth rate of ‘adjusted’ consumption, where the 
latter is defined as actual consumption minus its subsistence level. For the reasons given 
above, an agent’s subsistence consumption level is independent of his age. 
Although households of different ages choose the same labour supply and money 
demand per unit of consumption, in general they will have different lifetime wealth levels 
and choose different consumption levels. Other things being equal, households who have the 
good fortune to live longer will have higher wealth, and there will be a distribution of 
                                                 
3 See again Ascari and Rankin (2007) for a more extensive analysis.   6
consumption and wealth across the population in any period. For aggregate consumption to 
be a function only of aggregate wealth (and of relative prices), and thus for it to be 
independent of the shape of the wealth distribution, it is necessary that an individual 
household’s consumption be linear in their total lifetime wealth. For the utility function (1), 
we can confirm that this is the case. We thus preserve the feature that made easy aggregation 
possible, and macroeconomic analysis straightforward, in the original Blanchard (1985) 
paper. 
Given the above, we can derive a counterpart of the individual Euler equation, (5), in 
which individual is replaced by aggregate consumption. This is as follows: 
  11 1 (/) ( 1 ) (/) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 / 1 ) tt t t t t t t CZ L r C Z L q q V
δε δε ηε β ηε δ β
−−
++ + ⎡⎤ −= + −− − − − ⎣⎦ . (6) 
Absence of an ‘s’ subscript indicates an aggregate value (or, equivalently, an average value, 
since the population size is one). The relationship of a generic aggregate variable, Xt, to its 
constituent individual variables distinguished by generation, Xs,t, is  , (1 )
tt s
ts s t X qq X
−
=−∞ =Σ − . 
In the cases of Z and L we have already seen that individual and aggregate values are the 
same, but this is not generally true in the case of consumption. Nor is it true in the case of 
financial wealth, Vt, which, for an individual, is defined as the sum of his real balances and 
bond holdings: 
  ,, 1 1 , 1 (1/ )[ (1 ) ]/ s ts t t s t t Vq M i B P −− − ≡+ +.
4 (7) 
The ‘aggregate Euler equation’, (6), says that the growth rate of aggregate adjusted 
consumption depends positively on the real interest rate (as in the case of individual adjusted 
consumption), and (to the extent that q < 1) negatively on aggregate financial wealth. A 
similar relationship is found in Blanchard (1985) and other applications of the ‘perpetual 
youth’ model. The negative influence of financial wealth arises from the ‘generational 
                                                 
4 The relationship of aggregate to individual financial wealth is slightly different from the general one just 
given, being, rather,  (1/ ) (1 ) ,
tt s qV qq V ts s t
− =Σ − =−∞ . This is because we have included the annuity payout in our 
definition of Vs,t, but such a payout does not apply to the aggregate variable since it is a redistribution from those 
who die to the survivors.   7
turnover effect’.
5 Such an effect occurs because some old agents are replaced by newborn 
agents between t and t+1, and in general the newborn, since they have no financial wealth, 
have lower consumption than old agents, who have had time to accumulate it over their 
lifetimes. 
It remains to define composite consumption. We assume a continuum of types of good, 
indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. The household has CES utility over good types, given by: 
 
/( 1) 1( 1 ) /
,0 , , st ist CC d i
θθ θθ − − ⎡⎤ = ∫ ⎣⎦ ,      θ > 1.  (8) 
The subsidiary part of its optimisation problem is to allocate spending amongst good types to 
maximise (8) subject to a budget constraint 
1
0, , , , it ist st PC d i I ∫ = , where  , s t I  is its income 
available to spend on goods. This leads to the familiar constant-elasticity demand function for 
good type i: 
  ,, , , (/ ) (/ ) ist it t st t CP P I P
θ − =       where 
1/(1 ) 11
0, ti t PP d i
θ θ − − ⎡⎤ ≡ ∫ ⎣⎦ . (9) 
Moreover, at an optimum,  ,, / s ts t t CI P = . 
(ii) Firm behaviour 
Firms are monopolistic competitors who produce differentiated goods. As an input they 
use labour hired in a competitive market. Price staggering is introduced through Calvo’s 
(1983) mechanism, in which a firm is allowed to adjust its nominal price with probability 1-α 
in any period, while it has to keep it fixed with probability α. The optimisation problem of a 
firm, i, which receives the opportunity to adjust its price in period n, can thus be stated as: 
maximise  () ,, / nt n n t i tt EP
∞
= ΣΔ Π  (10) 
where  ,, , , it it it t it PY WL Π= − , 
 
11 1
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subject to  ,, it it YL
σ =       0 < σ ≤ 1,  (11) 
                                                 
5 This effect is so named by Heijdra and Ligthart (2000).   8
  ,, (/ ) it it t t YP P Y
θ − = , (12) 
  ,, 1 it it PP − =       with probability α, (13) 
 for  t = n,...,∞. 
Here,  , it Y , , it P , , it L  are the output, price and labour input of firm i. Wt is the wage and  , nt Δ  is 
the discount factor. The demand for good i is given by (12), which is the aggregation across 
all households of their individual demands, (9), plus the demand from the government (see 
below). Being infinitesimal relative to the economy as a whole, the firm treats the macro 
variables which shift its demand function, Yt and Pt, as given. It also treats Wt as given. 
This is a standard set-up in New Neoclassical Synthesis models. The nominal rigidity 
combined with monopolistic competition generates the Keynesian feature that output is 
demand-determined. This is because firms will always prefer to satisfy any unexpected 
increase in demand, given that price will have been set above marginal cost as a result of the 
firm’s monopoly power.  
Solving the optimisation problem yields the following expression for firm i’s ‘new’ or 
‘reset’ price: 
 





















− ΣΔ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
. (14) 
‘Xn’ denotes the new price set in period n. Symmetry amongst firms means that all firms able 
to change their prices in period n will choose the same new price, so that no ‘i’ subscript is 
needed. (14) is a forward-looking price-setting rule typical of models with Calvo-style price 
staggering. It says that the new price depends on current and expected future values of output, 
the price level and the wage level. 
The general formula for the price index was given in (9). Combining this with the Calvo 
pricing assumption, we obtain an expression for the price index as a function of current and 





tj t j PX
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− ∞−
=− ⎡⎤ =− Σ ⎣⎦ . (15)   9
This arises from the fact that, of all the prices in force in period t, the fraction which were last 
reset exactly j periods ago is (1-α)α
j. 
(iii) Government behaviour 
The government’s budget constraint in nominal terms is: 
  11 1 1 () ( ) ( )
NN N
tt t t t t t t t PG T i B B B M M −− − − −+ = − +− , (16) 
where  Gt is purchases of firms’ outputs, measured in terms of the composite good. We 
assume government spending on good i, Git, is determined by a demand function analogous 
to a household’s demand function, (9), and with the same price elasticity. Defining the real 
value of government bonds as  /
N
ttt B BP ≡ , we can rewrite the budget constraint in real 
terms, giving: 
  11 1 (1 ) ( ) / tt t t t t t t GT B rB MM P −− − −=− + + − . (17) 
Clearly, only three of the four policy instruments, (Gt,Tt,Bt,Mt), can be chosen 
independently in any period t. One of them has to be determined as a residual, to satisfy (17). 
Below, we always take Gt to be fixed at some exogenous, time-invariant, value, G. 
Furthermore we take the second independent fiscal instrument to be real government debt, 
inclusive of interest, which we denote as  (1 ) tt t B rB ′ ≡+ .
6 With either Mt or it being 
determined by the monetary policy rule (see below), this leaves the lump-sum tax, Tt, to be 
determined by (17) as the residual instrument of policy. Such a fiscal regime allows us easily 
to study the effect of a once-and-for-all change in the level of government debt. It is not our 
aim here to study an empirically realistic fiscal regime: for example, one that incorporates 
‘automatic fiscal stabilisers’, making Gt and Tt functions of output; or one that involves rules 
limiting the government deficit or debt levels to some percentage of GDP. Other authors have 
studied such regimes using models similar to the present one, but they involve several policy 
instruments changing simultaneously, so that numerous effects become tangled up together. 
                                                 
6 Government debt should therefore be thought of as ‘indexed’ debt. More precisely still, B′t is the number of 
‘real treasury bills’ issued, i.e. it is a promise to deliver B′t units of the composite consumption good to the 
holders of the bonds at the start of period t+1.   10
Here our main objective is to conduct a clean and simple fiscal experiment, to elucidate the 
mechanics of how the macroeconomy is affected. Amongst other things, by choosing the time 
path of  t B′ exogenously, we remove the endogenous evolution of government debt as an 
additional source of dynamics. 
(iv) Market-clearing conditions 
Equilibrium in the goods market requires that: 
  tt t YC G =+ . (18) 
Here the equation is written for the composite good, but a counterpart of (18) also holds for 
every good, i. 
To write down the condition for equilibrium in the labour market, we first need the 
aggregate demand for labour. The derivation of this is given in Appendix A. Equating 
aggregate labour demand to aggregate labour supply, where the latter is given by the inverse 
of (5) (dropping the ‘s’ subscript, for reasons explained), we have: 
 
1/( 1) 1/ / 1 (/) ( 1 ) / tt t t t t YP P Z W P
ε σθ σ δ ηδ
− − ⎡⎤ =− ⎣⎦
 . (19) 
Here,  t P   is a price index very similar to  t P  - see again Appendix A. Below, in order to study 
the macroeconomic implications of the model, we shall take a loglinear approximation to its 
equations. When we do this it turns out that, locally,  t P   =  t P , in which case  t P   drops out of 
(19). In fact, the aggregate labour demand function on the LHS of (19) is then simply the 
inverse production function applied to aggregate output, as can easily be seen. 
Equilibrium in the bond market requires that the exogenous, government-determined 
stock of bonds should equal the aggregate demand for them by households. In view of the 
role of aggregate financial wealth - bonds plus money - in affecting aggregate consumption, 
as was observed in (6), a helpful relationship to note is the following: 
  1 / tt t t VM PB + ′ =+ . (20)   11
One component of aggregate financial wealth,  t B′, is thus exogenous, under our assumed 
fiscal policy regime. The other component, the real money stock, is endogenous, and in 
money-market equilibrium this must equal money demand as given by the aggregate version 
of (4). 
(v) Steady-state general equilibrium 
In order to study the dynamics of the general equilibrium, below we will loglinearise 
the model. First, however, it is useful to comment on some features of the steady-state 
equilibrium in which all aggregate real variables are constant over time. We will confine 
attention to steady states with zero inflation since, later, the monetary policy regime will be 
constructed so as to ensure long-run price stability. 
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. (21) 
A steady-state value is denoted by absence of a time subscript. (21) shows that, in the long 
run, the value of output is positively related to that of money demand per unit of 
consumption. The reason for this is the ‘Brock effect’ mentioned earlier: higher equilibrium 
real balances raise the marginal utility of consumption, due to non-separability of the utility 
function, which in turn provides a stimulus to households to increase labour supply. Note that 
in the steady state prices have had time to adjust and so are effectively perfectly flexible, 
whence steady-state output is determined by the ‘supply side’ of the model. The Brock effect 
will be weak to the extent that δ is rather small. Indeed, empirically, we would expect δ to be 
small and this effect to be of minor significance. (21) also demonstrates the absence of a 
direct effect of government debt, B′, on steady-state output. This is despite the fact that 
overlapping generations, i.e. q < 1, imply that government bonds are ‘net wealth’ for the 
household sector, i.e. despite the fact that Ricardian Equivalence does not hold (as will be 
seen in another context below). The explanation is that the ‘modified GHH’ utility function 
has eliminated the wealth effect on labour supply. Were such an effect present, an increase in   12
B′ might be expected to directly reduce output by discouraging work effort. In fact, an 
increase in B′ does reduce steady-state output, but through the indirect channel of reducing Z, 
as will be shown later. 
A second relationship of interest is the steady-state version of (6), the ‘aggregate Euler 
equation’: 
  1 1/ (1 )(1/ )(1/ 1) / rq q V A β δ β += + − − − . (22) 
‘A’ in this denotes ‘adjusted consumption’, as defined above. (22) makes clear that, with 
infinitely-lived agents (q =1), the long-run real interest rate is simply determined by the time 
preference rate, i.e. by β. However, with overlapping generations (q < 1), the real interest rate 
exceeds this value, and the amount of the excess depends on the ratio of financial assets to 
adjusted consumption. Intuitively, (22) is the (inverse) ‘demand function for financial assets’. 
A high value of r causes households to choose a positive ‘tilt’ to their lifetime consumption 
profiles, and since - in a steady state - they have constant labour incomes, in order to achieve 
this they need to accumulate financial assets during their lifetimes. In the aggregate, such 
behaviour generates a positive demand for financial assets as a store of value. From (22) we 
can also see how Ricardian Equivalence fails when q < 1, since an increase in the stock of 
government debt, B′, adds to V (for the moment consider the other component of V, the stock 
of real balances, M/P, as given) and thus raises r. This means that government debt does 
affect real variables, and so is ‘non-neutral’ when q < 1. However, it remains to be seen 
exactly what form this non-neutrality takes in the complete general equilibrium. 
In a zero-inflation steady state where government debt, B′, is set to zero, and where G is 
also set to zero, we can derive the following completely reduced-form solution for r: 
  { }
1 21 / 2
2 1/ 1 [(1/ 1 ) 4 ] r βχ βχχ =− + ± − + + (23) 
 where 
1 (1/ )(1/ 1) [1 (1 ) ( 1) / ] qq χβ δδ σ θ θ ε
− ≡− − − − − . 
(23) is the solution of a quadratic equation in r. The larger of the two solutions for r 
encompassed in (23) is the relevant one. This is because the smaller solution is clearly 
negative, and since r also equals i in a zero-inflation steady state, it would imply a negative   13
value for the nominal interest rate, which is meaningless. We can easily see from (23) that 
when χ = 0, r = 1/β-1; while when χ > 0, r > 1/β -1. One special case in which χ = 0 is 
clearly when q = 1, which yields the result noted earlier that infinite lives leads to the real 
interest rate being equal to the pure rate of time preference. However another special case in 
which χ = 0 is in the limit as δ → 0. It is useful to pause here to understand why it occurs. 
First recall that δ is the exponent on real money balances in the utility function. As δ → 0, the 
demand for real balances tends to zero, as is apparent from (4). The equilibrium level of real 
balances is essentially determined by the demand for them, since even if the nominal money 
stock M is exogenous, what matters is the money stock in relation to the price level, and the 
latter is endogenous. Hence as δ shrinks to zero, so does the equilibrium stock of real 
balances. Since we have assumed that B′ = 0 in deriving (23), it is now clear that by letting δ 
tend to zero, we reduce the total stock of financial assets, V, to zero. The earlier equation (22) 
tells us that in this case, even if q < 1, the real interest rate will still simply equal the time 
preference rate. The intuitive explanation is that if the supply of financial assets is zero, for 
the market to clear the demand for them must also be zero, and to achieve this the real 
interest rate must be driven down to the time preference rate. 
(vi) A loglinearised and partially-reduced form of the model 
In order to investigate the macroeconomic properties of the model we now loglinearise 
its equations. The ‘reference’ steady state about which we take the approximation is the 
steady state with zero inflation, zero government debt and zero government spending. The 
value of the real interest rate in this steady state is given by the larger of the two solutions 
(23). This interest rate appears frequently as part of the coefficients of the loglinearised 
equations, and we henceforth denote it as rR. 
Appendix B provides a complete list of the underlying loglinearised equations. In the 
New Neoclassical Synthesis model to which ours is closely related, the standard way of 
combining these equations is in the form of a ‘New Keynesian Phillips Curve’ (NKPC) 
equation and an ‘IS’ equation. A third equation is also needed which depends on the 
monetary policy rule: if, for example, an interest-rate feedback rule such as the Taylor Rule is   14
used, this provides the third equation; while if the money supply is the instrument of 
monetary policy, then an ‘LM’ equation completes the model. We adopt the same general 
approach to summarising our model’s structure here. This yields the following equations 
(derived in Appendix B): 
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− =+ − −− + −  
 
11 1
1 ˆ (1 ) ( ) (1 ) R tt R t ri rv βζπβ χ ζ
−− −
+ ++ − − + , (25) 
 
1ˆ () tt t t R t zm p y r i
− =− −= − , (26) 
  1 tt t t vm pb + ′ =− + . (27) 
Unless otherwise stated, lower-case variables are the log-deviations of their upper-case 
counterparts; e.g. yt ≡ ln Yt - ln YR (where ‘R’ denotes the value in the reference steady state). 
πt is defined as pt - pt-1, the rate of inflation. ˆ
t i  ≡ ln(1+it) - ln(1+iR), and similarly for  ˆ t r  which 
appears below. Since  R B′  ≡ 0, the log-deviation of  t B′ is not well-defined; hence we use 
() / tt R R bB B V ′′ ′ ≡− . In the above and henceforth we have also set government spending, Gt, 
permanently to zero; hence yt and ct are the same variable. Two new composite parameters 
which appear here are 
11 1 (1 )[ (1 ) ](1 / ) ( / 1) R r κα α θ θ σ ε σ
−− − ≡− −+ −+ − and 
1 [1 (1 )(1 1/ ) / ] ζ δθ σ ε
− ≡−− − . These are both positive. 
(24) is the NKPC equation for our model, giving inflation as an increasing function of 
current output and of expected future inflation. It essentially derives from the price-setting 
and price index equations, (14) and (15), together with the condition for labour market 
clearing, (19). Compared to the standard model, its novel feature is the inclusion of zt, which 
is the result of the ‘Brock effect’ of real balances in stimulating labour supply, as discussed 
earlier. (25) is the IS equation which, as in the related literature, derives from the Euler 
equation for consumption. One of its distinctive features here is the inclusion of financial 
wealth, vt. This is the result of the ‘generational turnover’ effect on aggregate consumption,   15
as explained previously. Another of its distinctive features is the presence of zt and zt+1. These 
are a further consequence of non-additively-separable utility, which causes Zt t o  b e  a  
component of ‘adjusted consumption’, as seen above. Having seen that zt enters the NKPC 
and IS equations, it is clear that our model cannot be solved (unlike the standard model) 
without also using the LM equation, given by (26). With the LM equation we can eliminate 
zt, introducing further instances of ˆ
t i . 
The system consisting of (24)-(27) still does not provide a complete description of the 
economy’s dynamics because it remains to add a monetary policy rule. In the next section we 
do this using a Taylor Rule for the interest rate, and we study the macroeconomic behaviour 
which results. In the following section we carry out a similar analysis by instead assuming a 
simple rule for the money supply. 
 
3. Fiscal Policy when Monetary Policy is Governed by a Taylor Rule 
The standard way of representing monetary policy in recent years has been to assume 
that the nominal interest rate is set as a function of the inflation rate and of output. The best 
known example of such a rule is that of Taylor (1993). In our log-deviation notation, such a 
rule could be expressed as: 
  ˆ
tt t y t ii y π φ π φ =+ + . (28) 
In this,  π φ  and  y φ  are positive feedback parameters and  t i  is the ‘intercept term’, changes in 
which represent the purely discretionary aspect of policy. In fact, in what follows, we shall 
work with a simplified version of the rule in which  y φ  = 0. This helps to limit the amount of 
algebra while not affecting the main conclusion.  
The steady-state rate of inflation which results from this policy will depend, inter alia, 
on the steady-state value chosen for  t i  (which we may call i ). It is usual to parameterise the 
Taylor Rule in such a way that it delivers an exogenously-chosen ‘target’ level of long-run 
inflation. To achieve this, i  must be chosen appropriately. In the present paper, our interest 
is mainly in fiscal policy, so we take the value of the target steady-state inflation rate to be   16
zero. In the standard, infinite-lives model, where the steady-state real interest rate  ˆ r  ( ˆ i π ≡− ) 
is simply 1/β -1, zero steady-state inflation is obtained by setting i  = 1/β -1. (This can easily 
be seen from (28), with  y φ  = 0.) However in the overlapping-generations model  ˆ r  has a 
more complex set of determinants, one of which is the level of government debt. The level at 
which  i  needs to be set in order to ensure zero steady-state inflation is therefore endogenous 
and remains to be calculated below: it will simply be whatever is the associated level of the 
steady-state real interest rate. 
It is simplest to start by examining the effects of fiscal policy on the steady state, 
turning to the dynamics subsequently. The Taylor Rule itself plays no role in determining the 
steady state, other than via our assumption that steady-state inflation is zero. Hence for now 
we set aside (28), but we will return to it shortly. 
The system (24)-(27) may be used to solve for the steady state. In doing so, first note 
that the real-balances component of vt, mt - pt+1, may be substituted out as zt + yt - πt+1. Setting 
variables to time-invariant values, and π to zero, we then have four equations with (y,ˆ i ,z,v) as 
the unknowns. From this we can derive the following expressions for the steady-state values 
(y, ˆ i ) as functions of the government debt level, b′ (see Appendix C): 
  { }
1
11 (1 ) 1 [ (1 ) 1] RR R y rr r b βψ β ρ ψ ν ξ κ ψ
−
−− ⎡⎤ ′ =+ − − + + − −− ⎣⎦ , (29) 
  { }
1
11 1 ˆ (1 ) 1 [ (1 ) 1] RR R ir r r b ξ κ βψ β ρ ψ ν ξ κ ψ
−
−− − ⎡⎤ ′ = − +− −+ +−− − ⎣⎦ . (30) 
Four new composite parameters are introduced in these expressions, namely: 
 
11 1 [1 (1 )(1 1/ )] (1 ) R r ρ δθ ζ δ
−− − ≡− − − − ,      
11 [1 (1 )(1 1/ )] (1 ) R r ν δθ ζβ
−− ≡− − − + , 
 
11 [1 (1 )(1 1/ )] [ (1 ) 1] R r ψ δθ ζβ
−− ≡− − − + − ,      
11 (/ 1 ) R r ξ κε σ δ
−− ≡−. 
ρ, ν and ξ are unambiguously positive. ψ is positive if q < 1 or zero if q = 1, since then 1+rB 
> 1/β or = 1/β, respectively, as noted above. The signs of the coefficients on b′ in (29) and 
(30) can be seen to hinge on the sign of the bracketed term {.}, which is at first glance 
ambiguous. However the sign of {.} can in fact be resolved to be negative (see again   17
Appendix C). This reveals that, when q < 1, the effect of permanently higher government 
debt is to increase the steady-state interest rate (real as well as nominal, since inflation is 
zero) and to reduce steady-state output. We also see clearly that when q = 1 these effects are 
zero (since ψ is then zero), which is the manifestation of Ricardian Equivalence.  
The finding that higher government debt raises the interest rate is to be expected, since 
it is a standard result in other overlapping-generations models (e.g. Diamond (1965), 
Blanchard (1985)). The intuitive explanation for it here is that, as seen, overlapping 
generations gives rise to a demand for financial assets as a store of value which is increasing 
in the interest rate. Hence when the supply of such assets is increased by increasing b′, the 
interest rate has to rise to clear the asset market. The finding that output falls is perhaps less 
expected, especially since there is no capital in our model. The only variable input is labour, 
so the mechanism must involve a fall in labour supply. One might at first think that the 
mechanism is that the increased bond stock, being perceived as ‘net wealth’ by households, 
increases the demand for leisure and so reduces work effort. However, this is not correct, 
since our use of GHH preferences has removed the usual wealth effect on labour supply. 
Instead, the mechanism is the Brock effect: the increased nominal interest rate reduces the 
equilibrium stock of real money balances, and the non-separability of the latter in utility then 
acts as an alternative disincentive to provide labour. We would not expect this effect to be 
very significant empirically. In particular, the effect will be weak to the extent that δ, the 
weight on real balances in the utility function, is small. 
Next, consider the perfect-foresight transition path to the steady state following a once-
and-for-all increase in government debt. To be precise, suppose that in t = -1 the economy is 
in a steady state with no debt, and then in t = 0 there is an unanticipated tax cut, i.e. a fall in 
τt, which lasts for one period only. In all subsequent periods, taxation is adjusted to hold debt 
constant at its new, higher, level. The economy’s laws of motion in this situation can be 
written as: 
  1 ˆ (1 )[ ] tR t t t ry i ππ κ ξ + =+ − − , (31) 
 
1
11 1 1 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ (1 )( ) ( ) ( ) tt R t t t t t R t t t yi r y i i y r i b ρβ ρ ν πψ π
−
++ + +′ −= + − + −− −−+ , (32)   18
  ˆ
tt ii π φ π =+ . (33) 
This system has been obtained from (24)-(27) by substituting (27) into (25) (rewriting mt - 
pt+1 as zt + yt - πt+1), and then (26) into (24) and (25), using the definitions of (ρ,ν,ψ,ξ) above. 
(31) and (32) are slightly more reduced-form expressions for the NKPC and IS equations. 
Relative to the standard NKPC and IS equations, the differences are the term in ψ in the IS, 
which is present when q < 1 and represents the generational turnover effect; and the terms ξ 
and ρ in the NKPC and IS (respectively), which arise from non-separability of the utility 
function. 
The main result of the paper is visible from this system. It is clear that (31) and (32), 
with  ˆ
t i  being governed by the Taylor Rule, (33), constitute a pair of simultaneous first-order 
difference equations in (πt,yt).  πt and yt are both non-predetermined variables, so for a 
determinate perfect-foresight equilibrium to exist, we need the two eigenvalues of the system 
to lie outside the unit circle. Let us assume this holds - we return to this question below. Now 
notice that if the economy is initially in a steady state with b′ = 0 (and hence π = y = 0), and 
then in t = 0  t b′ is raised to some positive value b′ and held there ever after, then there is no 
time-variation in any exogenous variable of the system over t = 0,...,∞. The only exogenous 
variable in (31)-(32) is  t b′, and by assumption it is held constant at b′ for t = 0,...,∞. It then 
follows that the economy must jump immediately to its new steady state. This means that the 
impact effect on output, inflation and all other endogenous variables is the same as the long-
run effect. In other words, despite price stickiness and despite the lack of Ricardian 
Equivalence, the attempt to give a short-run Keynesian stimulus to output by a temporary tax 
cut fails. Output moves straight away to its new steady-state level which, as seen above, is 
lower - even if not much lower - than its initial level. 
We have constructed a model with the aim of formalising, in a modern DGE 
framework, the positive effect of a fiscal expansion on output which is familiar from more 
ad-hoc models such as the textbook IS-LM model. However, we have not succeeded, so the 
question arises of ‘why?’ We will argue that the culprit is the monetary policy regime. To 
show this, in Section 4 we study the same fiscal experiment under a different rule for   19
monetary policy. An intuitive understanding of why the Taylor Rule destroys the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy can best be obtained in the light of this comparison: see the end 
of the next section. 
First, however, we return to the question of determinacy of the perfect foresight 
equilibrium under a Taylor Rule. In Appendix D we prove that, conditional on δ being 
sufficiently close to zero, a necessary and sufficient condition for both eigenvalues of the 
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κδ θ σ ε ββ
+− −− −
>+
−− − + +− +−
. (34) 
In the standard ‘New Neoclassical Synthesis’ model with no feedback of the interest rate on 
output (φy = 0), the condition for determinacy is that φπ > 1 (the ‘Taylor Principle’). In our 
model we see that if φπ is greater than unity, this may or may not ensure determinacy. Notice 
that the critical value on the RHS of (34) is decreasing in κ. A key determinant of κ (which is 
the slope of the ‘short-run’ Phillips curve), is α, the ‘price survival’ probability and hence the 
degree of price stickiness, with κ tending to zero as α tends to one, and κ tending to infinity 
as α tends to zero. Sketching the inequality (34) as in Figure 1 below, we see that, for high 
degrees of price stickiness (low κ), a value of φπ much greater than one may be needed for 
determinacy. Conversely, for low degrees of price stickiness (high κ), a value of φπ less than 
one may be sufficient.
7  
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Bénassy (2005), on the other hand, finds that the magnitude of the feedback coefficient 
on inflation becomes irrelevant for determinacy when overlapping generations are 
introduced. It is notable that he assumes a different fiscal policy to ours, in which the total 
                                                 
7 Notice that the second RH term in (34) is less than one, insofar as 1+rR > 1/β.   20
nominal stock of government liabilities (bonds plus money) is held constant over time. 
Piergallini (2006), meanwhile, finds that overlapping generations relax the normal Taylor 
Principle, independently of the degree of price stickiness. 
 
4. Fiscal Policy When Monetary Policy is Governed by a Money-Supply Rule 
We now replace the Taylor rule by a rule which makes the monetary growth rate the 
exogenous instrument of monetary policy: 
  1 tt t mm μ − ≡− . 
We will presently assume μt = 0 in all periods, i.e. that the money supply is pegged at a 
constant value; but to show how μt enters the equations we begin with the more general case. 
The economy’s laws of motion under this regime are still given by (31) and (32). 
However the Taylor Rule, (33), is now replaced by: 
  11 1 1 ˆˆ ˆ () tt R t t t t ii r yy πμ ++ + + =+ − + − . (35) 
(35) is just the first-differenced version of the LM equation, (26). It can be seen that (31), 
(32) and (35) constitute a system of three simultaneous first-order difference equations in (πt, 
yt,  ˆ
t i ), i.e. a third-order system. To characterise its behaviour is hence more difficult than for 
the second-order system which represented the economy under a Taylor Rule. Under a Taylor 
Rule, the state variables (πt, yt) were both non-predetermined; here, although the same is true 
of each individual state variable (πt,  yt,  ˆ
t i ), a linear combination of them is, however, 




tt R t tt y ri m p π
−
− +− = − , (36) 
which has been obtained by subtracting mt-1 - pt-1 from both sides of the LM equation, (26). 
As of period t, the RHS of (36) is clearly exogenous (predetermined), so there are only two 
degrees of freedom in the way (πt, yt, ˆ
t i ) can ‘jump’ if an unexpected shock occurs. Our third-
order system is hence equivalent to a system with one predetermined and two non-  21
predetermined state variables. The fact that there is now a predetermined variable means that 
the economy will not in general jump straight to its new steady state when there is a 
permanent shock. This already hints that, under a money supply rule, the short-run impact of 
an increase in government debt is unlikely to be the same as the long-run impact. The 
question to be answered is what is the nature of this short-run impact: in particular, does it 
involve a boom in output? 
We can rearrange the system (31), (32) and (35) into a matrix equation with the 























⎡ ⎤ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ =+ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ′ ⎣ ⎦ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
. (37) 
From the foregoing we can say that determinacy of the perfect foresight equilibrium - 
‘saddlepoint stability’ - requires that the coefficient matrix A possess one eigenvalue inside, 
and two outside, the unit circle. In fact we can show that this condition holds with no 
additional parameter restrictions.
8 Moreover we can show that the unique stable eigenvalue 
(which we denote as λ1) lies in the interval (0,1), rather than the interval (-1,0). This implies 
that convergence to the new steady state following a shock is monotonic, rather than 
oscillatory. 
We now consider the same fiscal policy shock as in Section 3, namely a once-and-for-
all increase in government debt which occurs in t = 0, brought about by a tax cut in period 0 
only. Monetary growth,  ˆt μ , is held at zero for all t. The particular point of interest is to solve 














⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ =+ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
      for t = 0,...,∞, (38) 
where the vector multiplying  1
t λ  is the stable eigenvector of A. This vector is in general only 
unique up to a scalar multiple of itself. However, by making use of the initial condition (36) 
                                                 
8 The calculations required are lengthy and hence are not reproduced in the paper. They are available on request.   22
we can determine the absolute values of its elements and not just their ratios. To see this, first 
note that, setting t = 0 in (38), the absolute values (c11, etc.) can be interpreted as the initial 
values of variables measured as deviations from their new steady-state values (π0 - π, etc.) 
Let us next write (36) in a more schematic way, as follows: 
  10 20 3 0 0 ˆ dd y d i d π ++ = . 
In view of the preceding point, this is equivalently: 
  11 1 22 1 33 1 0 1 2 3 ˆ (, s a y ) dc dc dc d d d y di d π ++= − − −≡ . (39) 
(39) and the matrix equation which determines the stable eigenvector of A are sufficient to 
allow us to solve for (c11,c21,c31). We can combine them in a single matrix equation, such as: 
 
12 3 1 1
11 1 12 13 21








⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ −= ⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
. (40) 
Here, aij is an element of the matrix A. In writing (40), we have arbitrarily discarded the third 
equation of the system which defines the stable eigenvector, since one of the three in that 
homogeneous system is redundant. 
From (40), we can now obtain an expression for c21 (= y0 - y) by using Cramer’s Rule: 
 
1
21 1 11 23 21 13 [( ) ]det cd a aa a λ
− =− − . (41) 
Here, ‘det’ is the determinant of the matrix in (40). The sign of c21 determines whether, on 
impact, output jumps to a value above or below its new steady-state level. Note that the new 
steady state is the same under a constant money supply as it is under the Taylor Rule, since 
by construction π = 0 under the Taylor Rule, while a constant money supply clearly requires 
that inflation likewise be zero in the steady state. The steady-state values (y,ˆ i ) are therefore 
still given by (29) and (30) (recalling that π = 0 was the only feature of monetary policy used 
in their derivation). We hence know that the permanent increase in government debt will 
again cause output in the long run to be slightly lower. Given the price stickiness and the lack   23
of Ricardian Equivalence, however, we might conjecture that on impact output would exceed 
its long-run level, i.e. that there would be a boom. For this, we need to show that c21 > 0. 
Consider the signs of the constituent terms in (41). In the general case, the algebraic 
expressions for det and for the term [...] are complicated and not easy to sign. They are given 
in Appendix E. However, we can easily sign them if we let δ → 0, a restriction also appealed 
to earlier. This is the case where the weight on real balances in the utility function tends to 
zero. If δ is actually set to zero, the expressions simplify to (see again Appendix E): 
 
11
1 det (1 ) (1 ) νββ κλ
−− =−− − − , (42) 
 
1
11 1 2 3 2 1 1 3 1 () ( ) aa a a λν λ β
− −+= − . (43) 
Recalling that β
-1 > 1, these are clearly both negative.
9 By continuity, they will also be 
negative for δ in some sufficiently close neighbourhood of zero. d , the third factor in (41), is 
generally defined as the RHS of (39), i.e. it is just a linear combination of the new steady-
state values. Using the steady-state solutions (29)-(30) and the definitions of the ‘d’ 
coefficients implicit in (36), we have: 
 
1ˆ
R dy r i
− =− + . (44) 
We saw earlier that y < 0, ˆ i  > 0 when b′ > 0. Hence d  > 0, implying that c21 > 0. 
The above establishes that, under a constant money supply, fiscal policy is effective in 
raising output, unlike under a Taylor Rule. In fact we can prove that not only does y0 - y > 0 
hold, but also y0 > 0: output rises on impact relative to its initial steady-state value (zero) as 
well as relative to its new steady state value. Since we know that convergence to the new 
steady state thereafter is monotonic, the complete time path of output can then be depicted - 
in a purely qualitative way - as in Figure 2. In Figure 2 we also sketch the associated paths of 
inflation, the nominal interest rate and the real interest rate. For reasons of space, the algebra 
which demonstrates the qualitative features of these paths (i.e. y0, π0,  0 ˆˆ ii −  > 0 and  0 ˆ r  < 0) is 
not presented here, but it is available on request. We again use the assumption that δ is 
                                                 
9 λ1, although affected by δ, can be shown to remain in the interior of the interval [0,1] when δ = 0   24
sufficiently close to zero (and, in the case of  0 ˆ r  < 0, the assumption that β is sufficiently close 
to 1). 
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Why does the monetary policy rule make such a sharp difference to the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy? This can be answered by examining what happens to the money supply under a 
Taylor Rule. Under interest-rate control, the money supply is of course endogenous. We have 
that: 
  tt t t mz y p ≡+ + . (45) 
In the model of Section 3, the fiscal expansion was seen to cause the economy to jump 
immediately to its new steady state in which z and y are lower while π remains at zero. From 
(45) we then see that hiding behind the Taylor Rule is a sudden reduction in the money 
supply. This negates the expansionary effect on aggregate demand of the increase in the stock 
of government bonds. Under a money supply rule, on the other hand, the money stock is 
fixed, so it cannot adjust to offset the higher bond stock. In this case we obtain the 
‘Keynesian’ outcome which the textbook IS-LM model would lead us to expect. The 
endogeneity of the money supply under a Taylor Rule also explains why the new steady state 
is attained immediately. We know that real money balances must be lower in the new steady 
state. Under a money supply rule, this can only be achieved by a rise in the price level, which 
takes time, since the latter is sticky. Under a Taylor Rule, it is achieved by a fall in the 
nominal money supply, which ‘bypasses’ the price stickiness. 
   25
  5. Conclusions 
We have constructed a DGE model with staggered prices and overlapping generations, 
and have used it to study the macroeconomic effects of a one-off debt-financed tax cut. 
Surprisingly, given the lack of Ricardian Equivalence, we found that this does not give a 
short-run stimulus to output in our baseline model, but that output moves immediately to its 
new steady-state value, which is in fact lower (though probably not much lower) than its 
initial value. We then repeated the experiment, replacing the assumption of a Taylor Rule for 
monetary policy by the assumption of a constant money supply. In this case the expected 
short-run boom in output does occur. The choice of monetary policy regime is hence 
crucially important when assessing the effectiveness of fiscal policy. 
A debt-financed tax cut is the crucial policy experiment for assessing the effectiveness 
of fiscal policy as a tool of demand management because it provides the cleanest test of how 
much leverage the absence of Ricardian Equivalence generates. Another standard type of 
fiscal policy change would be a balanced-budget increase in government spending. This does 
not rely on a lack of Ricardian Equivalence for it to be non-neutral. We have not, up to now, 
formally analysed such a policy change in our model, but in similar models one usually finds 
that it lowers consumption, and thus has a multiplier of at most unity on output, even under 
price stickiness. We would expect this to be true here too. 
The fact that Taylor Rules cause fiscal policy ineffectiveness in a framework such as 
this leads on to the question of what role, if any, fiscal policy has as a tool of optimal 
macroeconomic stabilisation policy. We hope to investigate this in future work. The present 
result might suggest that fiscal policy has no useful role in stabilisation, and that stabilisation 
should be done entirely through monetary policy. However, such a simple conclusion is 
unlikely to be correct, because fiscal policy still has some real effects - such as on the real 
interest rate - even under a Taylor Rule. This makes it unlikely that a zero fiscal reaction to 
shocks is optimal. 
 Appendix A  The Aggregate Demand Function for Labour 
By inverting firm i’s production function we may write its demand for labour as a 
function of its output: 
1/
it it LY
σ = . Yit is demand-determined and given by (12). If firm i last 
changed its price j periods ago, then Pit = Xt-j, so that firm i’s demand for labour is: 
 (/ ) it t j t t LXP Y
θ −
− = . (A1) 
The proportion of firms who last changed their price j periods ago is (1-α)α
j. Summing 
across j = 0,...,∞, we then obtain aggregate labour demand as: 
 
/1 /
0(1 ) ( / )
j
tj t j t t LX P Y
θσ σ αα
∞−
=− =Σ − . (A2) 
If we define 
//
0 [( 1 ) ]
j
tj t j PX
θσ σθ αα
∞− −
=− ≡Σ −   this can also be written in the form: 
 
1/ / (/) ttt t LYP P
σθ σ =  , (A3) 
which yields the LHS of (19). 
 
Appendix B  The Underlying Loglinearised Equations 
 and the Derivation of the Partially-Reduced Form of the Model 
  1 () ( 1 ) tt t t p pp x αα − == + −  , (A4) 
 
11 1
1 (1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 / ) [ (1/ 1)( )] tR tR R t t t x rx r r w p y αα θ θ σ σ θ
−− −
+ =+ + + −+ − + + − +,(A5) 
 
1(1 ) tt t t wp y z σε δ
− =+ − −, (A6) 
  tt t y cg =+ , (A7) 
  ttt t zmpc ≡−− , (A8) 
 
1ˆ
tR t zr i
− =− , (A9) 
  1 ˆ (1 ) (1 ) (1 1/ ) tR t R t R t ar a r r r v ββ β χ + =+ ++ − + , (A10)   2
  1 ˆ ˆ tt t riπ + =− , (A11) 
  1 ttt p p π − ≡− , (A12) 




− = , (A14) 
  1 ttt t vmp b + ′ =− + , (A15) 
 
11 1
11 (1 ) (1 )[(1 ) ] tt R R tt t t gr r b b m m τδ δ
−− −
−− ′′ −=− + + − + − . (A16) 
Government spending and taxation are zero in the reference steady state, so their log-
deviations are not well defined. Hence we define gt ≡ Gt/YR, τt ≡ Tt/YR. 
To derive the NKPC equation, (24), we first use (A6) to eliminate wt from (A5): 
 
1
1 (1 ) tR t x rx α
−
+ −+  
 
11 1 (1 )[ (1 / ) ( / 1) (1 / ) ] R tt t rp y z αα θ θ σ ε σ θ θ σ δ
−− − =− + − + − + − − − + . (A17) 
Next, we ‘quasi-difference’ the price-index equation, (A4), to the same pattern as the LHS of 
(A17). That is, we advance (A4) by one period, multiply through the original equation by 
1(1 ) R r α
− +  and then subtract the latter from the former. This gives: 
 
11
11 1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )[ (1 ) ] tR t t R ttR t pr p p r pxr x αα α α
−−
+− + −+= − + + − −+. (A18) 
(A17) can now be used to eliminate the x variables from (A18). The p variables can then be 
grouped such that they can be replaced by π variables, which yields (24). 
To derive the IS equation, (25), we substitute (A11), (A13) and (A14) into (A10). Then 
we use (A7), with gt set to zero, to replace ct by yt. 
 
Appendix C  The Algebra of the Steady-State Solution 
To solve for the steady state we use the system (31) and (32). This is a slightly more 
reduced form of the system (24)-(27). Its derivation is described in the main text. Setting   3
variables to time-invariant values in (31) and (32), and also setting π = 0, we obtain a pair of 
equations in (y,ˆ i ). Solving these then yields the steady-state solutions (29) and (30). 
The common denominator of (29) and (30), namely the bracketed term {.}, is at first 
sight of indeterminate sign. Here we show that the sign is in fact negative. Using the 
definitions of the composite parameters already introduced, we may re-express two of the 
terms which appear inside {.} as follows: 
 
(1 )(1 1/ )( / 1)
(1 ) 1 [ (1 ) 1]











11 (1 )(1 1/ ) / 1
[( 1 )1 ] [( 1 )1 ]
1( 1 ) ( 11 /)





+− − = +−
−− −
. (A20) 
Recall that 0 < δ,σ < 1 and θ,ε > 1. Moreover in the main text we saw that 1+rR > 1/β when q 
< 1. Hence both the expressions in (A19) and (A20) are negative. It then follows that the 
common denominator, {.}, in (29) and (30) is also negative. 
 
Appendix D Determinacy of Equilibrium Under a Taylor Rule 
The characteristic equation of the system (31)-(33) can be computed as: 
 
2 0 ab c λλ ++ = , (A21) 
where λ denotes an eigenvalue, a = 1 and 
  { }
1 (1 ) 1 [( / 1) / ] RR br r π β κ ψ νε σ δ ρφ ψ
− ⎡⎤ =− + + − − + − + + ⎣⎦ , 
  { }
1 (1 ) [1 ( / 1) ( / ) ][ (1 ) ] [ (1 ) / ] RR R R R cr r r r r ππ κε σ δ φβ ψ κν βρ ψ φ
− =+ − − + − + − + + . 















. (A23)   4
First, consider the sign of the common denominator a-b+c. By manipulation of the 
terms for b and c, we can obtain: 
 (2 )[1 (1 ) ] RR abc r r βψ −+ = + + + −  
  { } (
1 (1 ) [1 (1 )][( / 1) / ] RR R rr r π κν ψ ν β εσ δ ρφ
− ++ −+ −+ + − +  
  )
1 [( / 1) / 1/ ] RR rr π εσ δ φψ
− +− + . (A24) 
We now claim that a-b+c > 0 for δ sufficiently close to zero. As δ → 0, 1+rR → β
-1, as was 
shown in the main text (see the discussion of (23)). This implies that ψ → 0 (from the 
definition of ψ). Hence the term on the first line of (A24) → (1+β
-1)2, which is positive. 
Concerning the term on the second line of (A24), note that ν-ψ is always positive (from the 
definitions of ν and ψ). The term {.} at first sight has an ambiguous sign. However, as δ → 0, 
ν remains strictly positive, while ρ → 0 (see the definitions of ν and ρ). Therefore {.} is 
unambiguously positive for δ sufficiently close to zero. Concerning the term on the third line 
of (A24), we note that it is always positive. This set of observations proves our claim. 
Second, consider the sign of c-a, the numerator of (A23). We can write c-a as: 
  (
1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) RR R ca r r r βψ
− −=+ + −+ −  
  { }
1 (1 )[( / 1) / ] RR rr π κν β εσ δ ρφ
− +− + − + 
  )
1 [( / 1) / 1/ ] RR rr π κεσ δ φψ
− −+ . (A25) 
We now claim that c-a > 0 for δ sufficiently close to zero. As δ → 0, 1+rR → β
-1, as was 
shown in the main text (see the discussion of (23)). This implies that ψ → 0 (from the 
definition of ψ). Hence the term on the first line of (A25) → β
-1(1-β), which is positive. The 
term on the second line of (A25) at first sight has an ambiguous sign. However, as δ → 0, ν 
remains strictly positive, while ρ → 0 (see the definitions of ν and ρ). Therefore {.} is 
unambiguously positive for δ sufficiently close to zero. Concerning the term on the third line 
of (A25), we note that it is always positive. This set of observations proves our claim.   5
From the foregoing it follows that, for δ sufficiently close to zero, condition (A23) is 
satisfied with no further parameter restrictions. It also follows that, for δ sufficiently close to 
zero, condition (A22) will be satisfied if and only if a+b+c > 0. Now, eliminating (ψ,ρ,ν) 
using their definitions, with some manipulation we can express a+b+c as: 
 
11 2 1 [1 (1 )(1 1/ )] (1 ) [ (1 ) 1] R RR abc r r r δθ κ ζ β




(1 ) 1 1( 1 ) ( 1 1 / ) ( 1 / )






β δθ σ ε
φ
κδ θ σ ε ββ
⎛⎞ +− −− −
×− − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ −− − + +− +− ⎝⎠
. (A26) 
a+b+c is clearly positive if and only if the term on the second line is positive. This is the 
same as the condition (34) in the main text. 
 
Appendix E Impact Effects of an Increase in Government Debt Under a Money Supply 
Rule 
The general expression for the determinant of the matrix in (40) can be computed as: 
  { } (
11 1
1 det (1 ) [ ] [ ][ (1 ) 1] (1 ) RR R R R R R rr r r r r r ρ νλ ν ψρ ν ψρ β κ
−− − =− −− − − + − − + − +  
  { } 11 (1 )(1 ) [ ] (1 ) 1 (1 ) RR R R rr r r ρ λλ ν ψρ β ψ ξ +− − + − − ++− − +  
{ } )
11 1
1 1 ( 1 ) ( 1) [ ] [ ( 1) 1 ] [ ( 1) 1] [( 1) ] RR R R RR R R rr r r rr r r νρ λ ν ψ ρ β β ψ λ
−− − ++ − − + − − + − + + − − − +
(A27) 
The general expression for (λ1-a11)a23 + a21a13 is: 
  { } (
11
11 1 2 32 1 1 3 1 ( ) (1 ) [1 (1 )] [ (1 )] R RR R aa a a r r r r λρ ρ β ν ψ λ
−− −+= − − + + + − +  
  ) 1 [] ( 1 ) RR rr νψ ρ ξ λ +− − + . (A28) 
In the limit as δ → 0, 1+rR → β
-1, as was shown in the main text (see the discussion of 
(23)). From the definition of ψ, this implies that ψ → 0. From the definitions of ρ and ξ, δ → 
0 also implies that ρ, ξ → 0. From the definition of ν, δ → 0 implies that:   6
 1(1 ) ( 1/ ) ν θσ ε →+ − − . 
Thus ν remains positive (and greater than one). 
Applying these special cases to the expression for det gives: 
 
11 11 1 1
11 1 1 det ( ) ( 1) [(1 )( ) ] ν λ ββ κ β λ β λλ ν β κ
−− −− − − =− − −− − − − . (A29) 
The first RH term is negative while the term [.] has an ambiguous sign, so the sign of det is 
still indeterminate. To proceed further, we now appeal to the characteristic equation. This is a 
third-order polynomial equation in λ. When δ = 0 one factor of the polynomial turns out to be 
λ-β
-1. Hence one eigenvalue is simply β
-1. This is clearly one of the two unstable eigenvalues. 
The stable eigenvalue, λ1, must therefore satisfy the second-order polynomial equation which 
remains when we cancel the factor λ-β
-1, namely: 
 
11 1 (1 )( ) (1 )( 1)( 1) 0 λβ λ λβ ν λ ν βκ
−− − −− + −− − − = . (A30) 
Now notice that, by rearranging this equation, we can re-express the term [.] in (A29) as     
(1-λ1)(β
-1-1)(1-ν). Substituting this into (A29) and simplifying, we obtain: 
 
11
1 det (1 ) (1 ) νββ κλ
−− =−− − − , 
which is (42) in the main text. 
Applying the above special cases to the expression for (λ1-a11)a23 + a21a13 gives: 
 
1
11 1 2 32 1 1 3 1 () ( ) aa a a λν λ β
− −+= − , 
which is (43) in the main text. 
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Parameter combinations for determinacy of equilibrium 
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Figure 2 
Time paths in response to a one-period debt-financed tax cut  
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